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Abstract: This paper develops a general equilibrium model with a vertical production struc-
ture to examine the relationship between o⁄shore outsourcing and international migration,
especially emphasizing their e⁄ects on the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Two-
way outsourcing (simultaneous insourcing and outsourcing) in skilled-labor intensive services
arises due to product di⁄erentiation and scale economies, and outsourcing in unskilled-labor
intensive processing occurs because of factor endowment di⁄erences. The tractability of the
model allows us to rank outsourcing and migration, according to the wages of both types
of workers. Finally, we also analyze under what conditions outsourcing and international
migration are complements or substitutes.3
1 Introduction
The rapid growth of international trade in business services is a topical issue among the
general public as well as economists. Freund and Weinhold (2002) report that, from 1995 to
1999, the expansion of trade in business services has far outpaced the growth of overall goods
and services. One driving force is the recent development of communication technology. The
Internet makes it possible to access low-cost skills for many types of business services, such
as data processing, software consulting, the readings of medical records such as X-ray ￿lms,
ultra-sound and CT records.1 As a result, the skilled-labor markets that used to be segmented
are being integrated internationally.
The media focuses on the fact that high-tech companies are increasingly outsourcing
their business services overseas to cut costs, and alarms that such o⁄shore outsourcing brings
adverse e⁄ects on home workers (Moran 2003; Roberts 2005). Outsourcing also continues to
attract the attention of economists (see for instance, Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan
2004 and Blinder 2006). Mankiw and Swagel (2006) state, ￿As technology develops and
global economic integration deepens, more jobs and people will be a⁄ected by actual or
potential o⁄shore outsourcing....Further development of theoretical models will foster better
understanding of the associated welfare impacts.￿
Meanwhile, international movement of workers is another driving force that integrates
labor markets across countries. The United Nations estimates that more than 175 million
people in the world live outside their countries of birth in 2002, and almost 1 in 10 people
living in the more developed regions is a migrant. Especially in the US, immigrants are every-
where, no matter the industry. Roberts (2005) reports that Wal-Mart is a leading business
lobby in Washington D.C., for a more relaxed and tolerant approach to legal immigration,
and the IT industry lobbies hard to relax visa restrictions on skilled immigrants from India.
Obviously, the intense debates on outsourcing and migration stem from their e⁄ects on
income distribution, and especially on the wage inequalities across sectors and the wage
gaps across countries. By casual observation, it might seem that outsourcing of produc-4
tion/services and migration of workers are two sides of the same coin. Thus in this paper,
we ask whether the labor market e⁄ects of o⁄shore outsourcing are similar to those of inter-
national migration, and if so, in what aspects?
Speci￿cally, we adopt a general equilibrium model with a vertical production structure.
There are two countries, each producing a ￿nal good with constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy. The production of the ￿nal good consists of two stages. In the ￿rst stage, di⁄erentiated
business services are combined and transformed into an aggregate service, which together
with unskilled labor, is used to produce the ￿nal good in the second stage. Each di⁄erenti-
ated individual business service in turn requires skilled labor as input, and is produced with
increasing returns to scale technology in monopolistically competitive markets.
We de￿ne two types of outsourcing. First, service outsourcing can be regarded as the
arm￿ s length trade of individual business services, and it arises due to product di⁄erentiation
and scale economies. We ￿nd that service outsourcing is a two-way phenomenon that consists
of both insourcing and outsourcing; that is, countries export and import business services
simultaneously. This is in fact an important feature in the U.S. economy, but such a reality
is often lost in the outsourcing debate.2 Second, outsourcing in unskilled-labor intensive
processing occurs because of factor endowment di⁄erences. We examine how each type of
o⁄shore outsourcing and international migration a⁄ect the wage income distribution among
skilled and unskilled workers, at both the national and international levels.3
We identify two wage e⁄ects: the productivity e⁄ect and the factor abundance e⁄ect. In
a closed economy, an increase in the number of skilled workers a⁄ects wages through two
channels. The ￿rst is an increase of service input, reducing the skill premium of wages.
This can be called the factor abundance e⁄ect. The second is the expansion of service
varieties, leading to higher productivity in ￿nal goods production, which in turn raises both
the skilled and unskilled wages. We call it the productivity e⁄ect. When the economy is
opened and outsourcing is allowed in both business services and labor processing, we ￿nd
that skilled workers gain as long as the productivity e⁄ect outweighs the factor abundance5
e⁄ect. When we further allow international migration of workers, multiple equilibria arises.
Which equilibrium emerges depends on the relative magnitude of the above two e⁄ects.
Nonetheless, the wage impacts of outsourcing and migration can be ranked, regardless of
which e⁄ect is bigger.
We then use the model to examine whether o⁄shore outsourcing and international mi-
gration exhibit complementarity or substitutability. On the one hand, outsourcing and
migration are substitutes since migration erodes the incentive for outsourcing in unskilled-
labor intensive processing. On the other hand, they are complements because skilled-labor
migration promotes service outsourcing. These results suggest that the e⁄ect of migration
on outsourcing depends on which type of workers migrate across country borders.
The literature on the relationship between trade and wages is extensive. Several empirical
studies ￿nd that growing imports of labor intensive goods from less developed countries
help cause the wage gap between the more educated and less educated workers in developed
countries (see Wood 1995), while some other studies say that this e⁄ect is not important (e.g.,
Lawrence and Slaughter 1993). Our model is closest and complements Feenstra and Hanson
(1996, 1999), who argue that trade expansion in intermediate goods plays an important role
in explaining the observed demand increase for skilled workers. In their model, intermediate
goods di⁄er in skill intensities, and trade expansion causes a shift of intermediate good
production across countries, leading to a rise in the average skill intensity. We show that
trade in skilled business services raises service variety and hence the demand for skilled
workers in both developed and developing countries due to an increase in their productivity,
which is another channel through which trade raises the demand for skilled workers.4
Like Ethier (1982), Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 11), Markusen (1989), and Mar-
rewijk et al. (1997) among others, we adapt the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monop-
olistic competition to international trade in di⁄erentiated intermediate services.5 However,
we adopt a production structure based on a Ricardo-Viner setting, in which each primary
factor is speci￿c to a sector, i.e., skilled workers are used for business services and unskilled6
workers for ￿nal good production. The rationale is that workers with technical skills may
be more mobile across countries than across sectors (e.g. Neary 1995), especially in this
age of globalization and regional integration. Our approach can be used to analyze in a
tractable way the various e⁄ects of both outsourcing and migration on income distribution
and industrial structure, and these e⁄ects can be ranked.
Harris (1998) points out that the Internet can cause ￿virtual mobility￿of workers by
reducing trade barriers in services. While he focuses on such mobility across identical regions
in a small open economy, our interest is in comparing the virtual mobility and the actual
migration of workers between developed and developing countries, by explicitly considering
two countries with skilled and unskilled labor, which enables us to examine the labor market
e⁄ects of migration and outsourcing.6
There is voluminous theoretical literature on international trade and migration, such as
Ethier (1985), Brecher and Choudhri (1987), Bond and Chen (1987), and Ishikawa (1994)
among others. However, none of these papers focuses on outsourcing. Markusen (1988) and
Francois (1994) examine migration issues with diversity of intermediate inputs and increasing
returns in production. In Francois, di⁄erentiated inputs are assembled into a ￿nal good
without using other primary factors. In our model, ￿nal good production requires unskilled
labor as well as di⁄erentiated services, which enables us to examine the relationship between
migration of workers and outsourcing of processing. Markusen (1988) explicitly considers
the skill formation of workers, but the skilled wage is always equal to the unskilled wage in
the diversi￿ed trade equilibrium and hence income inequality cannot be analyzed. In our
model, the skill premium is ￿ exible so that we can analyze the e⁄ects of migration on the
wage inequality. More importantly, the present paper complements the existing literature
by clearly demonstrating how the migration equilibrium is similar to or di⁄erent from the
outsourcing equilibrium in their e⁄ects on the wage distribution among skilled and unskilled
workers, both at the national and international levels.7
2 The Two-Sector Closed Economy
We start with the simplest case of one country with two sectors, ￿nal good and business ser-
vice. Business services (Z1;Z2:::Zn) are produced under variety-speci￿c increasing returns
to scale, and the market for business services is characterized by monopolistic competition.
The ￿nal good (y) is produced with constant returns to scale technology under perfect com-
petition, using unskilled labor L and a number of di⁄erentiated business services Z1;:::;Zn,
in the following form:
y = L
￿S
1￿￿; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)









; 0 < ￿ < 1: (2)
Each variety of business services uses only skilled labor H such that the production of zi
units requires hi units of skilled labor as a ￿xed cost and a constant marginal cost b:
hi = czi + b; (3)
where b;c > 0. Obviously, without outsourcing, zi = Zi in equilibrium.
On the demand side, all consumers have identical preferences, and enjoy utility from the
consumption of the ￿nal good Cy. We begin with an autarky situation. In the ￿nal good
market, given good and factor prices, competitive producers choose the index of business
services and unskilled labor to maximize their pro￿ts,
py(1 ￿ ￿)L
￿S
￿￿ = ps; (4)
py￿L
￿￿1S
1￿￿ = wL; (5)
where py is the price of the ￿nal good, ps is the price index of business services, and wL is8
the wage of unskilled workers (the unskilled wage). Eq. (4) gives the derived demand for
business services in the ￿nal good sector.
In the business service sector, each ￿rm takes as given the output of the ￿nal good y,
factor prices, and prices of other rival ￿rms. Since producers are symmetric, all varieties of





where wH is the wage of skilled workers (the skilled wage). Under monopolistic competition,















Now suppose there are two countries in the world economy, Home and Foreign. They are
identical in preferences, technologies, and endowments of unskilled labor, i.e., L = L￿.7
However, Home is more skilled-labor abundant than Foreign, i.e., H > H￿.8 In this section,
we examine the wage structures within and across countries in the autarky equilibrium. For
notational clarity, we call the international wage di⁄erence of the same type of workers the9
￿wage gap￿ , while the wage di⁄erence between skilled and unskilled workers within a country
the ￿wage inequality.￿We will show that an increase in the size of skilled workers has two
e⁄ects on the real wages, the productivity e⁄ect and the factor abundance e⁄ect. If the former
overwhelms the latter, both the skilled and unskilled wages are higher in the skilled-labor
abundant country than in the skilled-labor scarce country.
International Wage Gaps
With symmetric ￿rms, the price index of business services for Home is given as ps =
(n)
￿ 1￿￿








Using (4), (9), and (10), we can derive the real skilled wage (i.e., the wage-price ratio),
wH
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It implies that in equilibrium, the real skilled wage equals the ￿marginal product￿of business
services (skilled workers) in the ￿nal good sector.
An increase in the number of skilled workers a⁄ects the real skilled wage through two
channels. First, it raises the total output of business services nz proportionally, which can
be easily con￿rmed since the output of each business service z is constant and the number
of business services n is proportional to the size of skilled workers. This in turn negatively
a⁄ects the real skilled wage due to decreasing marginal productivity in ￿nal good production.
This e⁄ect appears as (nz)￿￿ in (11), and we call it ￿the factor abundance e⁄ect￿ .
Second, it also raises the marginal product of business services by increasing the variety of
such services. This positively a⁄ects the real skilled wage because a rise in the productivity
in the ￿nal good sector expands the demand for business services. This e⁄ect appears as
n
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ in (11), and we call it ￿the productivity e⁄ect￿ . If the productivity e⁄ect dominates10
the factor abundance e⁄ect, the real income of skilled workers would be higher in Home than
in Foreign.










Clearly, both the factor abundance and productivity e⁄ects positively a⁄ect the marginal
product of unskilled workers. Thus, an increase in the size of skilled workers raises the
productivity of unskilled-workers, increasing the real unskilled wage. This implies that the
real income of unskilled workers is necessarily higher in Home than in Foreign.
These are central properties in our model, and thus we state them in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Home has a greater size of skilled labor endowment than Foreign
and the productivity e⁄ect dominates the factor abundance e⁄ect. Then, the real wages of
skilled and unskilled workers in Home are higher than those in Foreign.
Proof: From (8), one sees that the number of business services proportionally increases


















(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿: (13)
The LHS of condition (13) is positive if and only if
1 ￿ ￿ > ￿: (14)
An increase in H results in a larger S, which decreases the real skilled wage through a
reduction in MPS =
@y











, a smaller ￿ implies
a smaller factor abundance e⁄ect. Also, 1=￿ equals the ratio of the average to marginal
cost in each business service, and thus ￿ is the inverse of the degree of scale economies in
service production. A greater degree of scale economies 1=￿ leads to a larger productivity11
e⁄ect.9 Therefore, condition (14) implies that the productivity e⁄ect dominates the factor
abundance e⁄ect. Q.E.D.
Domestic Wage Inequality
Next, let us look at the domestic inter-sectoral wage inequality. The skilled wage relative















The productivity e⁄ect is cancelled out because it a⁄ects the real skilled and unskilled wages
in the same way. However, the factor abundance e⁄ect remains on the RHS. That is, the
skilled-labor abundant Home has a lower income inequality than the skilled-labor scarce
Foreign, because a greater size of skilled labor implies a higher productivity of unskilled
labor.10
4 O⁄shore Outsourcing
Recall that the production process consists of two stages: ￿rst, di⁄erentiated service in-
puts are combined and transformed into the service index, and then, the service index and
unskilled labor are used to produce the ￿nal good. In this section we examine o⁄shore out-
sourcing, which can exhibit in several forms: that of services, of unskilled-labor processing,
and full outsourcing. We examine them sequentially and investigate how such outsourcing
a⁄ects wages.
Two-way Service Outsourcing
First, we analyze service outsourcing and its wage e⁄ects. In the service outsourcing
equilibrium, real skilled wage is lower in Home than in Foreign. This does not necessarily
imply that skilled workers lose in the skilled-labor abundant Home. In fact, we shall show
that service outsourcing can increase the productivity of workers and bene￿t both skilled12
and unskilled workers in both countries.
With service trade, Home ￿nal-good producers can use business services produced in














; 0 < ￿ < 1; (16)
where Vi is the home input of the foreign service. Given the property of the CES function
in (16), pro￿t maximization of the ￿nal good producers leads to
V + V ￿









v is the price of the foreign service, and Z￿ and V ￿ are the foreign inputs of the home
and foreign services, respectively. The world demand for Foreign relative to Home services
depends only on the service price ratio. The market equilibrium condition for services can
be written as
V + V ￿




where v￿ is the output of the foreign service. Due to the symmetric technologies, the service
outputs are equalized across countries, z = v￿ = ￿b=c(1 ￿ b). Since the relative demand
depends only on the relative price, output equalization implies that each country￿ s service
providers charge the same price, i.e., pz = p￿
v, which leads to Z = V and Z￿ = V ￿, i.e., the
inputs of the home and foreign services are equal in each country. Then, the service and
price indices in Home can be written respectively as








Using (4), (19), and (20), we derive the real skilled wage in Home as,
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Analogously, service outsourcing also occurs from Foreign to Home, and we can obtain a
similar expression for the real skilled wage in Foreign, by replacing L and V with L￿ and Z￿
in the above equation. In other words, outsourcing and insourcing exist simultaneously for
each country. Under two-way outsourcing, the same number of business services becomes
available in each country, and as a result, the productivity e⁄ects that depend on the variety
of services are equalized across countries.
Meanwhile, a di⁄erence arises in the factor abundance e⁄ect. In fact, with the balance of
trade equation, n￿p￿
vV = npzZ￿, and (18), we ￿nd that Home has a bigger factor abundance
e⁄ect than Foreign because
V =
nv￿
n + n￿ >
n￿z
n + n￿ = Z
￿: (22)
Since the service input demand increases with the number of services produced domestically,
Home enjoys a greater amount of service input than Foreign.
Notice that the scale advantage vanishes in the outsourcing equilibrium. Before service
outsourcing arises, Home skilled workers have a higher real income than Foreign counterparts,
as long as service production exhibits su¢ ciently high degree of scale economies. However,
outsourcing allows the productivity e⁄ects to be equalized between countries, and as a result,
Home loses its productivity advantage based on a larger number of skilled workers. Without
the productivity advantage, the larger scale of skilled workers generates only a greater factor
abundance e⁄ect. As a result, a scale disadvantage arises for skilled workers in Home. That
is, regardless of the degree of scale economies, the skilled wage becomes lower in Home than
in Foreign.14
As for the home unskilled wage, by using (5) and (19), we derive,
wL
py









A similar expression can be obtained for the foreign real unskilled wage by replacing V and
L with Z￿ and L￿, respectively in (23). Again, the productivity e⁄ects are the same but
the factor abundance e⁄ects are di⁄erent across countries. The larger input of total services
results in a higher marginal product of unskilled workers in Home than in Foreign. Theses
results are summarized as follows:
Lemma 2 In the two-way service outsourcing equilibrium, the real skilled wage is lower in
Home than in Foreign, but the situation is reversed for the real unskilled wage.
This result does not mean that service outsourcing adversely a⁄ects the welfare of Home
skilled workers. Comparing the above with the case of no outsourcing, namely (21) with
(11), one sees that service outsourcing bene￿ts skilled workers in Home, too. This arises
because outsourcing improves the productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers in both
countries. And this productivity e⁄ect is strong enough to overcome the loss due to the scale
disadvantage. As a result, service outsourcing generates a win-win situation such that:
Lemma 3 Both skilled and unskilled workers in both countries gain from service outsourcing.
Also, from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we obtain:
Corollary 1 Foreign skilled workers gain more from service outsourcing than Home skilled
workers.
This result suggests that service outsourcing is more bene￿cial for the skilled workers in
less developed countries than those in more developed countries.
Lastly, it can be shown that service outsourcing does not have any e⁄ect on the inter-
sectoral wage inequality. This is because the marginal products of both skilled and unskilled15
workers increase at the same rate, which suggests that service outsourcing is similar to a
Hicks-neutral technical progress.
Outsourcing of Unskilled-Labor Intensive Processing
So far, we have assumed that the ￿nal good is not tradable across countries. This
assumption implicitly excludes the possibility of outsourcing in unskilled-labor intensive
processing. As we have shown, in the service outsourcing equilibrium, the real unskilled
wage is higher in the skilled-labor abundant Home. If the ￿nal good is tradable, Home
would have an incentive to outsource the unskilled-labor intensive stage to Foreign and
export the ￿nal good produced there back to Home. In this section, we examine how such
outsourcing a⁄ects the wage of each type of workers.










where the service price indices are cancelled out duo to ps = p￿











As we have shown in (22), the service input demand is proportional to the size of skilled-
labor, and thus V > Z￿, which leads to py > p￿
y, i.e., the ￿nal good is more expensive
in Home than in Foreign. Since the real unskilled wage is higher in the former country,
producers there will outsource the unskilled-labor intensive stage to Foreign and export back
some outputs to Home. Such outsourcing increases the demand for services in Foreign, but
decreases that in Home, and eventually, V = Z￿, at which outsourcing is not pro￿table any
more.11
In Home, outsourcing of the unskilled-labor intensive stage promotes the exports of busi-
ness services, which leads to an increase in the demand for skilled-workers. Simultaneously,
the reverse importing of the ￿nal good reduces its price. These both increase the real skilled16
wage. However, the real unskilled wage declines due to a fall in the demand for unskilled
workers. And in Foreign, exactly the opposite arises.
Lemma 4 Outsourcing of unskilled-labor intensive processing provides an additional gain
for Home skilled workers and Foreign unskilled workers, but it hurts Home unskilled workers
and Foreign skilled workers.
When unskilled-labor processing is outsourced in addition to business services, the real
wages of both types of workers are equalized between countries. We can show that the Home
real skilled wage is
wH
py














by replacing V with z=2 in (21). Home skilled workers prefer outsourcing to autarky. Com-
paring (11) with (26), one sees that since 2n > n + n￿ > n, both the productivity and
factor abundance e⁄ects are positive on the real skilled wage. On the other hand, in Foreign,
the productivity and factor abundance e⁄ects are opposite to each other, but the positive
productivity e⁄ect outweighs the negative factor abundance e⁄ect under condition (14). We









This inequality is satis￿ed under condition (14), regardless of international di⁄erences in
skilled-labor endowments. That is, if the degree of scale economies in services is su¢ ciently
high, outsourcing necessarily bene￿ts skilled workers in Foreign as well as in Home.
Lemma 5 Suppose condition (14) holds, i.e., in autarky, both types of workers enjoy higher
real wages in Home than in Foreign. Then, skilled workers in both countries bene￿t from
outsourcing in both skilled-labor intensive services and unskilled-labor intensive processing.17
Similarly, by using (23), we can derive the real unskilled wage,
wL
py









In Foreign, unskilled workers necessarily prefer outsourcing to autarky since both the produc-
tivity and factor abundance e⁄ects are positive. But, in Home, the negative factor abundance
e⁄ect may overwhelm the positive productivity e⁄ect. In fact, by comparing (12) with (28),
we ￿nd that unskilled workers gain from outsourcing if and only if
2
￿n < n + n
￿: (29)
Given the di⁄erent endowments of skilled-labor, (29) is more likely to arise when condition
(14) holds, but less likely to hold as the di⁄erence in skilled worker endowments becomes
larger. In other words, if service production exhibits su¢ ciently large scale economies and/or
the di⁄erence in skilled-labor endowment is not too large, unskilled workers in Home gain
as well. We summarize these results as follows:
Lemma 6 Suppose that condition (29) holds, i.e., the degree of scale economies in services
is su¢ ciently high and/or the di⁄erence in skilled-worker endowments is not too large. Then
in both countries, unskilled workers bene￿t from outsourcing in both skilled-labor intensive
services and unskilled-labor intensive processing.
The above results are closely related to those of Krugman (1981), who shows that scarce
factors can gain from trade if either scale economies are important or countries are very
similar in factor endowments. In his model, depending on the degree of factor endowment
di⁄erences, a critical level of scale economies determines whether scarce factors gain or not.
This critical level needs to be greater as the di⁄erence in factor endowments is larger.
In contrast, in our setting, the critical level of scale economies for skilled workers is
independent of the di⁄erence in factor endowments. If (14) is satis￿ed, then (27) necessarily18
holds as long as n > n￿. Thus, skilled workers in unskilled-labor abundant Foreign gain from
trade regardless of the di⁄erence in factor endowments. However, with regard to unskilled
workers, we obtain the same result as in Krugman, i.e., the critical level of scale economies
depends on the di⁄erence in factor endowment ratios.
The above contrasting results arise because, unlike the Krugman model, the present
setting assumes that skilled labor is used in the service sector with scale economies but
unskilled labor is used only in the ￿nal good sector with constant returns to scale.12 Our
results suggest that skilled while workers are more likely to gain from specialization and
scale economies, unskilled workers are less likely to gain from the conventional distributional
e⁄ect.
Wage Inequality
It is worth investigating how outsourcing a⁄ects the wage inequality within countries.















Compared to autarky, outsourcing increases Home inter-sectoral wage inequality. This can
be con￿rmed by comparing (15) with (30).13 Intuitively, since Home is the net exporter of
services, which pulls up the demand for skilled workers, increasing the skilled wage. And
outsourcing in unskilled-labor intensive processing reduces the demand for unskilled workers,
decreasing the unskilled wage.14 Exactly the opposite e⁄ects arise and the wage inequality
declines in Foreign.15
Lemma 7 The inter-sectoral wage inequality rises in Home but falls in Foreign due to out-
sourcing in skilled-labor intensive services and unskilled-labor intensive processing.19
5 International Migration
In this section, we allow international migration of both types of workers instead of out-
sourcing. As we have shown in Lemma 1, under condition (14), both skilled and unskilled
workers earn a higher real income in Home than in Foreign. This is because the greater
number of skilled workers leads to a larger variety of services, increasing the productivity of
skilled workers. In this case, both types of workers migrate to Home from Foreign, and it
does not stop until all workers have migrated. On the other hand, if (14) is not satis￿ed,
the factor abundance e⁄ect dominates and the direction of migration is reversed. Skilled
workers migrate to Foreign, until eventually, both countries have the same size of skilled and
unskilled workers.
Migration Equilibria
We consider a situation in which either type of workers can migrate across borders. For
the moment, assume that both countries are incompletely specialized. In equilibrium, real


















n is negatively related to L￿
L if condition (14) is satis￿ed, i.e., the productivity
e⁄ect outweighs the factor abundance e⁄ect. Since the skilled wage increases with the number
of skilled workers, a rise in n￿
n raises the skilled wage in Foreign relative to Home. To o⁄set
this increase in the wage gap, L
L
￿ must decline. However, if (14) does not hold, the factor
abundance e⁄ect dominates and the skilled wage is negatively related to the number of skilled
workers. In this case, there is a positive relation between n￿
n and L￿
L .

















n must be positively related to L￿
L . An increase in unskilled immigrants leads to a fall
in the unskilled wage. To o⁄set this decline, there must be an increase in skilled immigrants.
Figure 1 depicts the migration equilibria. In panel (a), (31) is illustrated as a downward
sloping curve because the productivity e⁄ect outweighs the factor abundance e⁄ect. At point
E, the real wages of each type of workers are equalized across countries. This equilibrium
is unstable though, since we are considering a situation in which Home is more skilled-labor
abundant than Foreign and the initial condition for factor endowments is given by a point
such as A. As shown in Lemma 1, at point A, both types of workers earn a higher real
income in Home than in Foreign. If migration is allowed, they both would move to Home.
Without any restriction, the out￿ ow of workers does not stop in Foreign. And eventually,
the equilibrium is attained at point O in which all workers migrate to Home and Foreign
turns out to be a ￿deserted island￿ .
Meanwhile, panel (b) illustrates the case in which the factor abundance e⁄ect overwhelms
the productivity e⁄ect. Thus, (31) is drawn as an upward sloping curve. In this case, the
symmetric equilibrium point E is stable, and this is attained by the migration of skilled
workers to Foreign from Home.
6 Outsourcing vs. Migration
It is important to examine whether outsourcing or migration is more desirable in terms of
workers￿real income. In this section, we show that ￿a con￿ ict of interest￿may arise under
service outsourcing. In skilled-labor abundant Home, skilled workers prefer migration to
outsourcing but the opposite is true for unskilled workers. However, full outsourcing can
eliminate this con￿ ict, because it is equivalent or superior to migration for both types of
workers.
Recall that there are two migration equilibria, depending on whether condition (14) holds
or not. If the productivity e⁄ect outweighs the factor abundance e⁄ect, all workers would21





























We obtain two interesting ￿ndings for skilled workers, by comparing (21) with (33). On the
one hand, in terms of the productivity e⁄ect, service outsourcing and immigration are equiv-
alent. This is because the same variety of business services is available in either equilibrium.
On the other hand, there exists a di⁄erence in the factor abundance e⁄ect. The numbers
of skilled and unskilled workers increase in Home in the migration equilibrium, but remain
the same in the outsourcing equilibrium. Speci￿cally, the real skilled wage is higher in the





L + L￿: (35)
This holds since n
L > n￿
L￿ by assumption16. That is, Home is relatively more skilled-labor
abundant, and thus the factor abundance e⁄ect is greater in the outsourcing equilibrium
than in the migration equilibrium. Consequently, immigration is more desirable than service
outsourcing for skilled workers.
A similar argument can be applied to unskilled workers. By comparing (23) with (34),
we ￿nd that the productivity e⁄ect is canceled out, but the factor abundance e⁄ect remains.
In contrast to the case of skilled workers, the ranking of real income is completely opposite
because Home is relatively more unskilled-labor scarce. Thus the real unskilled wage is higher
in the service-outsourcing equilibrium than in the migration equilibrium i⁄ (35) holds.
Proposition 1 Suppose that condition (14) is satis￿ed. Then, in the migration equilibrium,
all skilled and unskilled workers concentrate in Home. For skilled workers, the real income22
is higher in the migration equilibrium than in the service outsourcing equilibrium. However,
the opposite arises for unskilled workers.
What if condition (14) is not satis￿ed, i.e., when the factor abundance e⁄ect overwhelms
the productivity e⁄ect? Then, the emigration of skilled workers from Home makes the size

































In Home, as compared to autarky, the emigration of skilled workers hurts unskilled workers.
Thus, home unskilled workers prefer service outsourcing to migration. Meanwhile, it is not
obvious whether the same result holds or not for skilled workers because they bene￿t from
migration as well as service outsourcing. A direct comparison of (21) with (36) shows that







This condition is more easily satis￿ed as ￿ rises. The positive productivity e⁄ect is greater
under service outsourcing, but the negative factor abundance e⁄ect is smaller under emigra-
tion of skilled workers. The productivity e⁄ect is dominated by the factor abundance e⁄ect
under a su¢ ciently large ￿. It follows then Home skilled workers prefer migration to service
outsourcing.
Applying a similar argument, we can show that, in Foreign, skilled workers prefer service
outsourcing to immigration but the opposite arises for unskilled workers. If (14) is not
satis￿ed, skilled workers lose from immigration of skilled workers and thus they prefer service
outsourcing to immigration. In contrast, by using (23) and (37), we can show that unskilled23






This condition is more easily met as ￿ rises. That is, in Foreign, unskilled workers prefer
migration to service outsourcing if the degree of scale economies is su¢ ciently small. We can
summarize these as follows:
Proposition 2 Suppose that condition (14) is not satis￿ed and the degree of scale economies
is small enough for (38) and (39) to hold. Then, in the migration equilibrium, countries are
symmetric in the sizes of both skilled and unskilled workers. In Home, the real skilled wage
is higher under migration than under service outsourcing, but the opposite is true for the real
unskilled wage. And exactly the opposite arises in Foreign.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that a con￿ ict of interest among workers with di⁄erent skills
may arise in either country, regardless if condition (14) is satis￿ed or not.
Finally, we examine how the above result would change if we allow outsourcing in
unskilled-labor intensive processing. As is clear from Lemma 4, such outsourcing can bene￿t
skilled workers but harm unskilled workers in Home. The issue is how full outsourcing a⁄ects
the ranking of the real wages. Again, condition (14) is critical. If the productivity e⁄ect
overwhelms the factor abundance e⁄ect (i.e., condition (14) is satis￿ed), then the real wage
of each type of workers is identical to that under immigration. That is, migration and full
outsourcing are equivalent.
On the other hand, if the factor abundance e⁄ect outweighs the productivity e⁄ect (con-
dition (14) is violated), then the equivalence above does not hold. Since outsourcing makes
available a greater variety of services, the productivity e⁄ect is higher under outsourcing
than under migration. This implies that full outsourcing is superior to migration in terms
of the real wages of both skilled and unskilled workers.24
Proposition 3 (i). If condition (14) holds, i.e., the productivity e⁄ect outweighs the factor
abundance e⁄ect, then full outsourcing and immigration are equivalent in terms of the real
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers. (ii). If condition (14) is violated, the full
outsourcing equilibrium is superior to the migration equilibrium.
Somewhat surprisingly, equivalence between migration and outsourcing arises again in
terms of their e⁄ects on the inter-sectoral wage inequality. This is because the productivity
e⁄ect is cancelled out and full outsourcing is equivalent to migration in terms of the factor
abundance e⁄ect.
Corollary 2 The e⁄ect of migration on the wage inequality is equivalent to that of full
outsourcing, regardless if condition (14) holds or not.
7 Outsourcing and Migration: Complements or Sub-
stitutes?
There is a large literature on whether commodity trade and factor mobility are complements
or substitutes.17 In this section we discuss this issue in the context of the present model. Our
analysis suggests that international migration and outsourcing of unskilled labor-intensive
processing are substitutes, since the former erodes the incentive for the latter. However,
service outsourcing and migration of skilled workers are complements because the latter
promotes the former.
Let us ￿rst consider the service outsourcing equilibrium. Recall that, in this equilibrium
unskilled workers earn higher real wages in Home than in Foreign. This implies that unskilled
workers would migrate to Home from Foreign. Meanwhile, the opposite result arises for
skilled workers due to their higher real wage in Foreign rather than in Home. In either case,
such migration leads to equalization in the skilled-unskilled labor ratios between countries,
i.e., the equilibria would lie on the 45 degree ray from the origin in Figure 1.18 Thus, the real25
wages of both types of workers are the same as those in the full outsourcing equilibrium.19
It follows that international migration of workers is a substitute for outsourcing in unskilled-
labor intensive processing. Therefore, there is no incentive for such outsourcing in the
migration-cum-service-outsourcing equilibrium.
In addition, migration may promote service outsourcing. Suppose that the migration
equilibrium is achieved only through movements of skilled workers from Home to Foreign.
This can be caused by government restrictions on unskilled-worker immigration. Then in
equilibrium, the sizes of skilled workers are equalized between countries, and the volume of
service imports in Home is (n+n￿
2 )V 0 =
(n+n￿)v￿
4 , where the import of each foreign service is
V 0 = v￿
2 . This is greater than the one in the service outsourcing equilibrium, n￿V = n￿nv￿
n+n￿ ;
obtained from (22).20 The emigration of skilled workers expands the foreign production of
services, increasing Home imports of them. That is, the emigration of skilled workers is a
complement for service outsourcing.
On the other hand, the migration equilibrium can also be achieved only through the
movements of unskilled workers from Foreign to Home. Such migration does not have any
e⁄ect on the volume of service imports since the number of skilled workers does not change.
In this case, service outsourcing is independent of unskilled-worker migration. Thus we have:
Proposition 4 International migration is a substitute for outsourcing in unskilled-labor in-
tensive processing, but skilled-worker emigration is a complement to service outsourcing.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzed the e⁄ects of outsourcing and migration on the wages of both skilled
and unskilled workers. Our main ￿ndings are summarized in Table 1, which shows the e⁄ects
of respectively migration and outsourcing on wages relative to autarky in the case where the
productivity e⁄ect outweighs the factor abundance e⁄ect. Outsourcing raises all wages and
reduces the wage gap between countries, but migration widens the international wage gap26
and the wage inequality in the country that attracts workers.
We also examined whether o⁄shore outsourcing and international migration are comple-
ments or substitutes. International migration is a substitute for outsourcing in unskilled-
labor intensive processing. This arises because outsourcing in labor processing is caused
by factor endowment di⁄erences and migration leads to the equalization of skilled-unskilled
labor ratios between countries. Meanwhile, service outsourcing and skilled-labor migration
are complements because the increasing similarity in the sizes of skilled workers promotes
two-way outsourcing in di⁄erentiated business services.
Finally, the present model can probably be extended to a setting of two sectors (business
services and ￿nal good) and three factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital). Over the
past two decades, the importance of FDI in￿ ows increased in developing countries (Goldberg
and Pavcnik 2007). Incorporating capital may enable us to examine the relationship between
outsourcing and actual capital movement, and the impact of capital movements on the wage
inequality. We leave these for future research.
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Notes
1Mattoo (2002) states, ￿while some developing countries are increasingly investing in
other countries to export services, most supply services via cross border sales (for exam-
ple data processing)... Developments in information and communication technology have
dramatically increased the scope for cross-border exports of services, ranging from software
developments in the Philippines to data processing in Barbados... One of the most striking
recent examples of developing-country service export success story is the Indian software
industry.￿
2 Griswold and Buss (2004, p. 5) report that ￿In 2002, ... U.S. companies exported
$14.8 billion worth of computer, data processing, research, development, construction, ar-
chitectural, engineering and other IT services. During that same year, Americans imported
$3.9 billion of those same kinds of services. So for every dollar Americans sent abroad for
IT outsourcing in 2002, the world sent more than three dollars to the United States for
￿ insourcing￿ .￿
Note that in this paper, outsourcing does not mean the relocation of a whole stage of
the production process from one country to another. Instead, it means the import of new
intermediate services available only from abroad. For instance, World Investment Report
2004 (2004, p. 171) reports that Nortel (a Canadian company) started outsourcing some
parts of software development activities to India not because it could achieve cost savings
by the relocation of its R&D activities but because it saw a serious constraint in terms of
a shortage of locally available technical skills. Nortel started using Indian programmers not
because it substituted them for North American programmers but because it complemented
its software development activities.
3Jones (2005) reviews the existing literature on the labor market e⁄ects of outsourcing
and immigration.
4Also, Acemoglu (2003) argues that trade liberalization induces skill-biased technological
change, which leads to an increase in wage inequality in developing countries. However, the32
empirical evidence is mixed (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007).
5Ethier (1982) and Markusen (1989) assume that di⁄erentiated producer services are
costlessly assembled into a ￿nal good. In Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 11), the
production of a ￿nal good uses capital and labor in addition to a variety of di⁄erentiated
intermediate inputs. Marrewijk et al. (1997) generalize these models in that both ￿nal
goods require di⁄erentiated producer services and primary factors, and examine the e⁄ects
of service trade liberalization on the factor price equalization set by the use of the World
Integrated Equilibrium a la Helpman and Krugman. All of these models have a Heckscher-
Ohlin feature such that production requires two primary factors.
Another branch of the literature has a Ricardian feature in that only labor is used in
production. Marrewijk, Stibora, and Vaal (1996) consider technological di⁄erences between
countries, i.e., di⁄erentiated intermediate services can be produced only in one country, and
examine the welfare e⁄ects of service trade liberalization. In addition, Matusz (1996) merges
a model of monopolistic competition in intermediate goods with the Shapiro-Stiglitz model
of e¢ ciency wages to show that the introduction of international trade leads to increased
employment in both countries.
6Recently, Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antras and Helpman (2004) also examine
outsourcing of production, but their interests are di⁄erent from ours since they analyze the
organizational structure of ￿rms. In addition, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop
a model based on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework to study the labor market e⁄ect of o⁄shore
outsourcing, but they do not make a comparison between outsourcing and international
migration. In a most recent paper, Mitra and Ranjan (2007) study o⁄shoring by focusing
on unemployment which is caused by search frictions.
7Let a superscript ￿ denote variables associated with Foreign.
8We only consider manufacturing and services industries, where outsourcing is most ac-
tive. Goldberg and Pavcnic (2007) state, ￿when China liberalized its markets, many ￿rms in
Hong Kong shifted their relatively less-skilled-labor-intensive activities to Chinese border re-33
gions, while specializing in higher-skilled intensive activities, such as headquarter services, at
home.￿Of course, LDCs and DCs can di⁄er in many other aspects, such as land and capital
endowments, agricultural technology, labor market institutions, etc., which we abstract from
in this paper. In spite of these di⁄erences, some developing countries such as Columbia and
Mexico recently implemented various policy changes including labor market reform, which
substantially increased labor market ￿ exibility (Goldberg and Pavcnic (2007)).
9Since the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated services is equal to 1
1￿￿, the
parameter ￿ is also the measure of the degree of substitution. A smaller ￿ leads to a higher
degree of di⁄erentiation and a larger productivity e⁄ect.










, which implies that the skilled
wage is higher than the unskilled wage if skilled workers￿factor share is greater than their
endowment share, relative to those of unskilled workers.
11The nature of unskilled-labor outsourcing is the improvement in production e¢ ciency,
since it equalizes the marginal products of unskilled labor across countries. This arises
because, in the full outsourcing equilibrium, Home exports services and imports the ￿nal
good, i.e., its balance of trade equation would be py(Cy ￿ y) = pzn(z ￿ Z) ￿ p￿
vn￿V . Since
V = Z￿, we have py(Cy ￿ y) = (pzn ￿ p￿
vn￿)V , which implies that the di⁄erence in the size
of skilled labor results in inter-industry trade. Also note that complete specialization does
not arise because labor is sector speci￿c.
12In Krugman￿ s setting, both factors are used in the sectors with scale economies, and
in this sense, both factors are symmetric. In contrast, skilled and unskilled workers are
asymmetric in the present model.







, which is higher















because of the factor abundance di⁄erence between countries.
14Hong Kong experienced a large increase in the relative demand for skilled workers after
￿rms shifted relatively unskilled-labor-intensive production activities to China (Hsieh and34
Woo (2005)).
15India experienced an increase in wage inequality during recent decades and such an
increase is mainly attributed to skill-biased technological changes within industries (Kijima
(2006)). Examining the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality in India remains a topical
issue (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)).
16In deriving (35), we use the expression of V in (22) to rewrite (21).
17For a description of recent developments on this topic, see Jones (2000, Ch. 1).
18See the Appendix for proofs.
19This can be easily con￿rmed because the equalization of skilled-unskilled labor ratios
leads to the equality of the factor endowment e⁄ect under migration-cum-service outsourcing





V 0 ￿ n￿V =
(n￿n￿)2v￿
4(n+n￿) > 0:35
Service outsourcing Full outsourcing Migration
Home skilled wage + + +
Foreign skilled wage + + -
Home unskilled wage + +* +**
Foreign unskilled wage + + -
Home wage inequality 0 + +
Foreign wage inequality 0 - -






y ) - - +






y ) - - +**
Table 1: Wage e⁄ects relative to autarky when 1 ￿ ￿ > ￿ holds, i.e., all types of workers
concentrate in Home in the migration equilibrium. * indicates that the sign holds if ￿ is
su¢ ciently small and/or skilled-labor endowments are su¢ ciently similar between countries.
** indicates the sign holds if ￿ is su¢ ciently small.36
Figure captions: Figure 1: Migration equilibria
Figure 137
Appendix
Proof: We now derive the condition for the migration-cum-service-outsourcing equilibrium.
























For the real unskilled wages to be equalized between countries, condition (A3) must hold.
Q.E.D.